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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE B. BAKER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. ) Case No. 16857 
H.B. WADE, et ux. 
Defendants-Appellee. 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by Wayne B. Baker ("Baker"), a judg-
ment creditor of Charles W. Taggart ("Taggart"), from a deter-
mination entered in favor of defendants-appellee, Mr. and Mrs. 
H.B. Wade, after trial in the District Court of Salt Lake County. 
Baker sought to have a March, 1975 transfer of certain real 
property from Taggart to the Wades set aside and the Wades' 
interest in the property declared an equitable mortgage in the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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principal amount of $20,000 (R. 107), so that plaintiff could 
execute upon the property. 
Baker obtained a $45,813.51 judgment against Taggart on 
May 22, 1975. He states, and appellees have no reason to 
question, that no payment has been made on that judgment. R. 2. :tl 
Therefore, Taggart's present indebtedness, including interest, ~ 
to Baker is approximately $60,000. Appellant's Brief, p.2. 
This action originally was brought against the Wades, Taggart, ;u 
Valley Bank & Trust Company and Conrrnercial Security Bank. Plain- ~i 
tiff sought a declaration that his rights in the property were 
superior to those of Taggart and the banks (R. 4-5) and he ob-
tained judgment by default or by sununary judgment as to each of 
them. R. 22-23, 64-65. The matter went to trial on November 14, n~ 
1977 as an action exclusively between Baker and the Wades. 
Plaintiff's claim against the Wades was this: On March 19, 
1975, Taggart had deeded his home to the Wades. R. 3. Plaintiff 
claimed, alternatively, that the transfer was for purposes of 
security only, was without fair consideration or was made to 
hinder, delay and defraud Taggart's creditors. R. 3-4. He 
prayed that the conveyance be declared null and void or that the 
Court declare the Wades to have only an equitable mortage on 
the property. R. 5. By the time of trial, plaintiff had aban-
doned his other claims and alleged only that the transfer was 
"' 
in the nature of a mortgage and sought only that the Wades' interes 
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be adjudged to be an equitable lien. The Wades responded that 
the transaction was a purchase with an option allowing Taggart to 
buy back the property (which expired unexercised). Although an 
option or a mortgage each allows the optionor or mortgagor to clear 
title to his property by paying a certain sum, a mortgage guarantees 
payment of principal and interest to the mortgagee, while an option, 
if unexercised, leaves the optionee with no recourse against the 
optionor if the property turns out to be worth less than he paid for 
it. Further, a mortgagee remains owner of the demised property, 
while an optionee does not. The Wades claimed that the evidence 
indicated that the transaction bore the characteristics of a sale 
with option. R. 183-185; Appellant's Brief, p. 15. The property 
having appreciated from $45-$50,000 to as much as $120,000 during 
Wade's ownership (R. 127, 133), reversion of title to Taggart 
would have enabled Baker, through execution, to discharge all prior 
encumbrances upon the property (including what he claims is the 
Wades' equitable mortgage) and collect "in excess of $50,000" 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 12) -- all or nearly all his judgment --
from the balance. A claim such as plaintiff's must be proved by 
clear and convincing evidence. The District Court rejected Baker's 
claim. 
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1. The Sale of the House 
In the spring of 1975, Charles Taggart was in serious 
indeed, desperate -- financial straits. His business had 
failed and he "was just out of money." R. 98. He had had no 
income since 1974 and had been borrowing money to meet his 
living expenses. R. 117-118. His only remaining substantial asset 
was equity of between $15,000 and $25,000 in his home. R. 133. 
(The home had a value of $45-$50,000 and was encumbered by 
two mortgages with a combined balance of $25-$30,000. Ibid.) 
He had tried to borrow without success and finally approached 
H.B. Wade ("Wade") for funds. R. 98. The upshot of their 
discussion was 
Ibid. 
... [H]e wouldn't grant me [a] loan. But he would buy 
the house and .. we ... worked out the terms of the sale 
of that house ... . 
... [T]he original purchase price that we agreed upon ... 
was $20,000 .... I said I wouldn't sell the house although 
the value was approximately there, unless I had an option 
to buy it back. 
(At that time, Taggart had some frail hope of recouping his 
losses and of being able to regain his house. R. 101, 121.) 
The sale was concluded on March 19, 1975. Taggart quit-
claimed h.is house to Wade by a deed which was absolute on its 
face; Wade paid Taggart $10,000 and agreed to pay a second 
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$10,000 after June 18, 1975 if Taggart had not bought the property 
back by that time (R. 97-99, 109; Exh. P-2), pursuant to an option, 
also executed on March 19, by which Wade agreed to sell the house 
back to Taggart for $10,900 by June 18, 1975. R. 100; Exh. P-4. 
Taggart was unable to exercise the option. By November 28, 
1975, Wade had paid Taggart an additional $7,000, for a total 
payment of $17,000. R. 103-110. Taggart waived the remaining 
$3,000 payment in return for an option to purchase the home for 
$20,900, plus 18% of the $20,000, by November, 1976, or $24,500. 
R. 111. That option expired unexercised in 1976. R. 124. In 
recognition that the Wade performance was concluded, Wade's 
last payment, a check dated November 28, 1975, was endorsed by 
Taggart as: "BALANCE IN FULL FOR EQUITY IN HOME LOCATED at 234-
7th AVENUE, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH." R. 106, Exh. P-8. 
Wade purchased the Taggart home as long-term investment. 
He planned to give or sell it to one of his sons, should either 
be interested in the house. R. 181. In the meantime, Wade has 
allowed Taggart to occupy the house as a tenant at will, in 
consideration of his servicing the two mortgages on the property, 
including loan payments, taxes and insurance (at a total monthly 
payment of about $450) and maintaining the property. R. 114, 
130-131. 
There never has been any question between Taggart and 
Wade as to who owned the house. Wade has behaved like a 
landlord, and a harsh one, at that. He has given Taggart orders 
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concerning the house's operation and threatened him with 
eviction if he did not comply. R. 129. He required Taggart 
to get rid of his dog, to replace a back door and paint the 
house, all under threat of eviction. Ibid. When Taggart fell 
behind in mortgage payments, Wade ordered him to come current 
or be evicted. Ibid. Taggart has even been compelled to re-paint 
his living room to conform to Wade's taste. That incident, as 
described by Mr. Taggart, typifies the kind of landlord Mr. Wade 
has been: 
He went in once and said I had to paint the inside of the 
living room [which] had some -- I thought at least, some 
lovely scroll work in between the beams. I asked him what 
color he wanted it painted and he said white. It looks 
somewhat like a monk's cell in there now, but I painted 
the inside. 
R. 114. On the other hand, Wade has never attempted to recover 
the payments he made to Taggart, as a lender would, or conunenced 
foreclosure proceedings. R. 122-123. 
Taggart has behaved like a man who considered himself a 
tenant. He acceded to all Wade's orders (R. 114, 129), told 
friends that he was renting (R. 131, 144-146) and, when approached 
by realtors who were interested in a possible sale of the house, 
told them that he was not the owner. R. 131-132. In 1978, 
Taggart believed he could raise $20,000 or more and asked Mr. Wade 
if he would sell him the house back; Wade refused. R. 124-125. 
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Taggart's and Wade's relationship can only be described 
as that of a seller and buyer. Taggart gave Wade a deed to 
the home. Wade agreed to pay him $20,000, which later was 
reduced by $3,000 in consideration of a second option to pur-
chase the house. The agreed-upon price of $17,000 was paid. 
Taggart received a fair price for his equity of $15,000 to 
$25,000. Wade's last check was endorsed by Taggart as "Balance 
in full for equity in home located at 234 - 7th Avenue." 
Taggart never made a payment to Wade and Wade never sought 
repayment, attempted foreclosure, or otherwise undertook a 
creditor's remedies. Wade consistently refused to allow Taggart 
to buy back the house after the second option's expiration; 
a mortgagee, of course, would have had no choice but to accept 
payment of the loan and to release the mortgage. 11 Finally, 
Wade consistently behaved like a landlord toward Taggart -- and 
not a kind or indulgent one at that: he ordered him to get rid 
of his dog, repaint his living room to suit Wade's taste, etc. 
~aggart still needed cash in 1977, 1978 and 1979. As 
the house's value appreciated from $45,000 or $50,000, subject to 
$25,000 or $30,000 in mortgages, to perhaps $120,000 in 1979, with 
no additional encumbrances, other than the alleged equitable 
mortgage (R. 127, 133), it would have been greatly to his 
advantage to sell the house, pay off the mortgages -- if Wade 
was a mortgagee -- and pocket the profit. 
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2. The Testimony and Documentation. 
Plaintiff does not challenge the accuracy of the above 
testimony or dispute that all above-described documents and 
events were wholly consistent with a buyer-seller relationship 
and wholly inconsistent with a lender-borrower relationship. 
Plaintiff's attempt to rebut rests principally on two legs. The 
first is Taggart's prior testimony; the second are three "promissor 
notes" which Taggart executed. Appellant's Brief, pp.8-10. 
Taggart's prior testimony is a bit garbled. In a deposi-
tion which plaintiff offered in evidence, he testified; 
A "oh, I thought at that time-- Listen, I thought at 
that time, I would turn the thing around quickly." 
Q "Question: Pay the money and get your property back?" 
A "Sure." 
Q "You felt it was basically a loan and he was secured 
by the deed. Is that correct?" 
A "No, we treated it as I said in my first testimony, as 
a loan. But he had the option and I hoped to be able to 
pay it back. If I couldn't pay it back--" 
Q "He had the property?" 
A "He had the property, of course." 
Q But your testimony there does say it was treated as 
a loan? 
A Well, I--maybe I said that, but in my mind, I may have 
treated it as that, but in actuality, he owned the property. 
Q All right. Let's look at page 18, 14r. Taggart, and 
let's do the same thing. 
"Question: What were these monies for?" 
A "Well, when I sold the house to Mr. Wade, I sold it 
for 20,000, not $10,000. I felt that I was borrowing the 
first $10,000 with the option to buy it back." 
Cited at R. 101-102. That testimony establishes nothing other 
than how confused a witness can become under cross-examination. 
Taggart denied that the transaction was "basically a loan'', then 
said "we treated it as a loan" (whatever that meant), then said 
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"in my mind, I may have treated it like that, but in actuality, 
he owned the property. 11 His final answer, perhaps, is the most 
revealing: "[W]hen I sold the house ... I felt that I was bor-
rowing the first $10,000 with the option to buy it back." 
(emphasis added). With his life collapsing around him, Taggart, 
although he knew that he had sold his last worldly possession, 
tried to pretend it wasn't so. 
In March, 1975, Taggart was clinging to the hope that he 
could salvage his business like a drowning man grasping a life 
preserver. He has recounted his state of mind at the time: 
... I had no idea what was happening to me. I had no id~a 
that things were collapsing around me and I thought that 
I could turn this around very quickly and buy the house 
back. 
R. 107. (Of course, the situation's hopelessness would have 
been obvious to any-objective observer. Taggart's business had 
failed and he had earned no income since 1974. R. 117-118.) He 
acknowledged very poignantly: 
I have always known I sold the house, but I always 
had hope -- hope springs eternal and I always thought I 
could buy it back. 
R. 142. 
Plaintiff also offered in evidence an excerpt from a sup-
plemental proceeding which was conducted on July 7, 1975: 
Q "Question: Now, you borrowed some money or allegedly 
some money some time ago and gave a deed to your home to 
someone, did you not?" 
A II I did." 
Q "Question: Who was that person?" 
A "Answe.r: H.B. Wade. " 
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Q "Question: Does Mr. Wade live here in Salt Lake City?" 
A "Yes, he does." 
Q "Did you borrow on--" 
A "Well, yes." 
Q "When did you borrow that money?" 
A "Ninety days ago or so." 
Q "Question: Did you sign a note?" 
A "No, I--well, I signed a Quit Claim Deed, I know that." 
Q "Question: You gave a deed to your home as security, 
is that right?" 
A "That is right." 
R. 117. Mr. Taggart did not sign that transcript and had no 
recollection of giving the testimony. R. 132-133. Defendant's 
counsel objected to the transcript's admission. In overruling 
the objection, the Court noted the transcript's relative weakness 
as evidence: 
I think [the objection] goes to the weight. It is 
certainly true. I don't think Mr. Taggart ever read it 
like he would a deposition, but I don't think it affects 
its admissibility, just its weight. So it is received. 
R. 134. 2/ 
2/The Court obviously accorded little weiglt to the transcript, 
and properly so. In the supplemental proceeding, Taggart was 
being pressed hard by an extremely skilled attorney, who was 
trying to establish that Taggart, not Wade, owned the house. 
Taggart simply was not his interrogator's equal. ("Q Did you 
borrow on-- A Well, yes." "Q Did you sign a note? A No, I--
well, I signed a Quit Claim Deed, I know that.") One can only 
speculate on what Taggart's answers would have been if he had had 
a chance to reflect upon the interrogation (as he would have if 
the transcript had been submitted to him for signing). It is 
clear that in July, 1975, he still hoped to get his house back 
through the exercise of a second option; it is not surprising 
that a combination of wishful thinking and tough examination 
could have extracted the answers which he gave. 
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The second -- and most relied upon -- basis of plaintiff's 
claim that this was a mortgage rather than a sale is Wade's 
strange practice of having Taggart sign "promissory notes" to 
him. R. 98-99, 103-104, 110; Exhs. P-3,7,9. At trial, plaintiff 
offered three such notes in evidence. Those notes simply make 
no sense. First, they are in the total principal amount of 
$27,000 although Taggart received only $17,000 from Wade. Second, 
they are completely inconsistent with the transaction's other 
documentation. The documentation consists of: 
a. A quit-claim deed by Taggart to Wade dated March 19, 
1980, representing a transfer of the house to Wade which is abso-
lute on its face. R. 97-99, Exh. P-2. 
b. A promissory note dated March 18, 1975 by Taggart 
to Wade Finance (a name under which Wade does business) 
in the sum of $20,000 at interest of 18% per annum, payable 
on December 22, 1975. R. 98-99, 171; Exh. P-3; 
c. An option agreement dated March 19, 1979, entitling 
Taggart to buy back the house for $10,900 by June 18, 1975. 
R. 100, Exh. P-4. 
d. A check dated March 19, 1975 by H.B. Wade, on his 
personal account, to Charles W. Taggart in the amount of $10,000. 
R. 99, Exh. P-5; 
e. A check dated October 15, 1975 by H.B. Wade to Charles 
W. Taggart in the amount of $3,750.00. R. 103; Exh. P-6; 
f. A promissory note dated October 15, 1975 by Taggart 
to Wade (as H.B. Wade, rather than Wade Finance) in the sum of 
$3,850, at interest of 18% per annum, payable on November 22, 
1975. R. 103-104, Exh. P-7. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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g. A check dated November 28, 1975 by H.B. Wade to 
Charles w. Taggart in the amount of $2,400 endorsed "BALANCE 
IN FULL FOR EQUITY IN HOME LOCATED AT 234 7th AVE. SALT LAKE 
CITY, UTAH. Charles W. Taggart." R. 106; Exh. P-8; 
h. A promissory note dated November 28, 1975 by Taggart 
to H.B. Wade in the sum of $3,150, at interest of 18% per annum, 
h P -9. 3/. payable on December 22, 1975. R. 110, Ex . 
If the trust deed, option, checks, and Taggart's and Wade's 
testimony are considered alone, the transaction is easily 
comprehensible: Wade agreed to buy the home for $20,000 and 
paid $10,000 do~; Taggart deeded him the property. Wade 
gave Taggart an option to buy the property back for $10,900 
within three months. Taggart was unable to exercise the option, 
but requested a second, one-year, option, which Wade gave him in re 
turn for a $3,000 reduction of the purchase price. Wade then paid 
Taggart the balance due and owing, with the last payment made 
on November 28, 1975 (by a check which Mr. Taggart endorsed, 
"BALANCE IN FULL FOR EQUITY IN HOME ... "). Since March, 1975, 
Taggart has occupied the house as a tenant at will, paying rent 
in the form of $450 monthly payments and maintenance. All the 
above conduct and documents, of course, are consistent with a 
sale of the house; they would be wholly inconsistent with a 
mortgage. 
3/Wade gave Taggart $850 in addition to the above checks. 
R. 103, 110, 158. 
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The promissory notes, if they really are promissory notes, 
are hopelessly inconsistent with the other documents and the 
parties' conduct; indeed, they make no sense whatever. The "notes" 
total $27,000, but only $17,000 changed hands between Wade and 
Taggart. When Wade gave Taggart $10,000, Taggart gave him a 
note for $20,000, payable by December 22. On October 15, Taggart 
signed a note for $3,850, payable on November 22. On November 28, 
Taggart signed a note for $3,150 payable on December 22, but 
simultaneously endorsed the check he received from Wade as pay-
ment in full for his house. Those "notes" bear no relation to 
reality. 
a. Taggart, who had received $10,000 on March 19, never 
would have agreed to pay back $20,000 plus 18% annual interest 
$22,700 -- by December 22 or sign additional notes obliging him 
to pay a total of $27,000 plus interest on November 22 and 
December 22, when he had received only $17,000. 
b. If Taggart had borrowed $10,000 at 18% annual interest 
on March 19, he could have liquidated that indebtedness and dis-
encumbered his house by paying $10,450 on June 18 (or a lesser 
sum if he paid sooner). He would not have executed an option 
agreement which required him to pay $10,900. (Indeed, it would 
have been conunercially preferable to pay off the note in December, 
rather than pay the equivalent of 36% annual interest in June.) 
On the other hand, if Taggart owed Wade $20,000, Wade would have 
been foolish to release his collateral for $10,900. Plaintiff's 
loan theory and the option agreement simply are incompatible. 
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c. Wade never attempted to collect on his notes (which 
entitled him to principal, interest and attorney's fees) or 
foreclose on the house, as any prudent lender would, particulariy 
with a borrower as impecunious as Taggart. 
d. Finally, there obviously was no reason for Wade to 
make a loan to Taggart. Taggart's prospects were dismal. A 
mortgage upon his property almost certainly would have been fore-
closed, a troublesome and expensive process. It was far more 
to Wade's advantage to buy the property at once, thus avoiding 
the inevitable foreclosure, obtaining control of the property 
at once, etc. 
e. If Taggart were a borrower, Wade would not have had 
him endorse, and he would not have endorsed, his last check as 
"balance in full" for his home. That is language appropriate 
to a sale, not a loan. 
The "notes" do not make sense, whether they are considered 
separately or in the context of the entire transaction. (Plaintif1 
counsel acknowledged in his closing argument: "It doesn't make 
sense to me, either." R. 199.} Mr. Taggart recognized the in-
congruity of those notes: 
Well, Mr. Wade does things a little differently than 
anyone I have been around. Each time he gave me money, 
he made me sign a note. Actually, the reverse should be 
true. I said, "Mr. Wade, you owe me the money." But 
he said this is his form of recordkeeping. 
You know, he is -- I think he is a very shrewd man 
but not brilliant. And he comes from, you know, a country 
man from -- This is the way he does business. 
R. 99. 
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As I said, each time I ever received any money from 
Mr. Wade, he made me execute a note to him. And I said 
to him---and we have had extended conversations over this--
"Why is it that I sign a note to you when, in reality, 
you owe me the money?" And he, I believe--and you will 
have to ask him, but he uses this for his records. As he 
explained it to me, this is what he used to--so there 
would be no misunderstanding of what took place. He wanted 
to make sure that I knew that I had sold that house. 
R. 106. 
Mr. Wade has testified: 
[W]hen I advanced him the $10,000 with option to re-purchase 
it with the understanding if he couldn't ... pay the option, 
then I· would pay him the balance of this money. 
Q Why did you draw up a Promissory Note, though? 
A Well, that's the way I do business. I've done 
it all the time. I've never had any repercussions from 
it. Because--one thing I didn't want to have in this deal 
with Mr. Taggart was a misunderstanding .... It was to apply 
against this $20,000. He couldn't say it went in some-
thing else. 
R. 17 9. 
Considered in context with the transaction's other documentation, 
the "notes" are contradicted by all the other documents. Taggart and 
Wade both testified that the notes simply were Wade's idio-
syncratic way of keeping track of his business transactions. 
Mr. Wade is an elderly, uneducated and somewhat eccentric 
person. He is a former Greyhound bus driver who turned to buying 
real estate and lending money. R. 148, 175. Some of his lack 
of sophistication is conveyed by the printed page, but his con-
tinual mispronunciations, halting vocabulary and difficulty 
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comprehending ordinary business concepts are far more evident 
to one who can observe him in person, as Judge Winder did. 
The remaining grounds upon which plaintiff challenges the 
District Court's findings are the claim that Taggart "continues ... 
to occupy the property making monthly mortgage payments of 
approximately $450 as his sole 'rent'" (Appellant's Brief, p.3) 
and that Taggart has deducted the interest payments which were in-
cluded in the mortgage payments on his income tax, while Wade, dur· 
ing 1977 and 1978, did not report any rental income from, or deduc1 
any interest payments on, the property. Id., p.4. The District 
Court apparently did not assign these claims much weight. The cla~ 
of inadequate rent is easily answered. Taggart's monthly rent is 
more than $450 per month; it consists of $450 per month plus main-. 
tenance. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate, or even allege, that 
even $450 a month is an unreasonably low rent. (Indeed, most persc 
would consider $450 a month to be a rather stiff rent.) 
Mr. Taggart's deducting the interest payments from his in-
come tax may be a practice of questionable propriety, but it is 
hardly compelling evidence of a mortgage. Mr. Wade's failure 
to properly report matters on his income tax seems more indicative 
of general sloppiness than anything else. Mr. Wade turns over his 
records to an accountant, who in turn prepares his tax returns. 
He testified, quite candidly, "Don't ask me, because I never fill~ 
out one of these forms in my life. My CPA man filled those." 
R. 168. On further examination, Mr. Wade stated that he did not 
recall what records he had sent to his "CPA man" for preparation 
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of his 1977 and 1978 returns. Ibid. It certainly is likely 
that he had no documents from which the accountant would have 
gleaned knowledge of those payments. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT 
PROVE BY A CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING PREPONDERANCE 
OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE 
TRANSFER OF TAGGART'S HOME 
ACTUALLY WAS A MORTGAGE. 
The transfer of Taggart's home to Wade was, on its face, 
an absolute transfer of ownership. To have such a transfer 
found to be as equitable mortgage and set aside, plaintiff 
must demonstrate by a clear and convincing preponderance of 
evidence that both parties intended the transaction to be a 
mortgage rather than a sale. Ideal Elec. Co. v. Willey, 20 
Utah 2d 182, 435 P.2d 921, 923 (1968). If plaintiff failed to 
discharge that burden as to the transferor or the transferee, 
defendant must prevail. Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156, 
158 (Utah 1976). 
Judge Winder correctly observed, ''I think it just boils 
down to what the intention of the parties was at the time this 
occurred." R. 187. Plaintiff concedes that he was obliged to 
prove his case by a clear and convincing preponderance of evi-
dence and that the District Court properly identified the 
question before it. 
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The burden of proof by clear and convincing preponderance 
of the evidence requires the proponent to establish that "the 
truth of the facts asserted is highly probable." Cook v. 
Michael, 214 Or. 513, 330 P.2d 1026, 1032 (1958). Accord, 
Johnson v. Wilson, 276 Or. 69, 554 P.2d 157, 161 (1976). This 
Court held in Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194, 
204-205 (1949) (Wolfe, J), that clear and convincing proof is 
that which 
... carries with it, not only the power to persuade the 
mind as to the probable truth or correctness of the 
fact it purports to prove, but has the element of clinch-
ing such truth or correctness. Clear and convincing 
proof clinches what might be otherwise only probable to 
the mind. . .. 
But for a matter to be clear and convincing to a 
particular mind it must at least have reached the point 
where there remains no serious or substantial doubt as 
to the correctness of the conclusion .... 
Accord, Jardine v. Archibald, 3 Utah 2d 88, 279 P.2d 454, 457 
(1955) . 
The United States Court of Appeals, in Aetna Ins. Co. v. Padd~ 
301 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1962), held proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence to require that the evidence be 
" ... clear, distinct and weighty so as to enable [the 
trier] to come to a clear conviction without hesitancy 
of the truth of the precise facts in issue." 
Accord, Philippine Sugar Estates Dev. Co. v. Government of 
Philippine Islands, 247 U.S. 385 (1918). The burden of proof by cl 
and convincing preponderance is substantially greater than the burd 
of proof by a mere preponderance of evidence. E.g. In re Levias, 
83 Wash. 2d 253, 517 P.2d 588, 590 (1973); Vernette v. Andersen, 
16 Wash. App. 466, 558 P.2d 258, 261 (1976). 
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The District Court found 
on conflicting evidence that the intention of Messrs. 
Wade and Taggart at the time of the March 19, 1975 
conveyance, was that Taggart was selling his real prop-
erty to Wade, subject to an option to repurchase in 
Taggart, and that the intention was not simply that 
there be a loan of money from Wade to Taggart and with 
the latter using the real property as security therefor. 
R. 80. Of course, Judge Winder found more than was necessary 
for a judgment against plaintiff. If he had found even that 
the weight of the evidence favored plaintiff, but not clearly 
and convincingly so, he still would have had to enter judgment 
in defendant's favor. The trial court's finding could have 
been far less favorable to defendant than it was without the 
case's outcome being different. 
Even if the matter were before this Court for trial de nova, 
plaintiff would have to fail. It cannot conceivably be said that 
it is "highly probable" that both Taggart and Wade intended their 
transaction to be a loan or that the evidence is so "clear, dis-
t• tinct and weighty" as to leave one with "a clear conviction" of 
that proposition when: 
a. Both participants have sworn to the contrary; 
b. The option agreement, which is essential to plaintiff's 
case, 4/ recites a purchase price and option fee which are greatly 
at variance with the principal and interest set forth in the 
~ purported promissory notes; 
c. Taggart endorsed his final check from Wade as payment 
in full for the house; 
4/without a right to redeem the property, the deed cannot be 
intended as a mortgage. Such a right is not conclusive 
that a mortgage was intended; but without the right there 
can be no mortgage. 
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d. Wade and Taggart have behaved like landlord and tenant 
throughout their relationship; 
e. Taggart consistently has held himself out to others 
as being a mere tenant; 
f. Taggart offered to buy the house back after the 
mortgage's expiration, but Wade refused; 
g. Taggart, who had he been a mortgagee, could have sold thE 
house as it appreciated in value, discharged the "mortgage" 
and kept the profit; he did not do so; and 
h. Wade never attempted to collect his "loans" or foreclose 
his "mortgage". 
Plaintiff's rebuttal to the foregoing consists principally 
of Mr. Wade's extraordinary "notes", which bear so little re-
lation to reality that they do not even represent the amount 
of money which actually changed hands. It perhaps is conceivable 
that some trier of fact would believe, by a preponderance of 
evidence, that Taggart and Wade both were lying under oath, that 
all their manifestations of a sale were for naught and that 
the "promissory notes" really did represent a mortgage; but to 
claim that any trier could come to "a clear conviction without 
hesitancy" of those propositions strains the imagination, 
and to claim -- as plaintiff must -- that Judge Winder was 
"plainly unreasonable"~ in having at least a "substantial 
doubt" about plaintiff's allegations is preposterous. 
5/A finding of fact may be reversed only when it is "so 
plainly unreasonable that no trier of fact could fairly make 
such a finding". Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 
592 P.2d 620, 626 (Utah 1979). 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS WERE 
NOT CLEARLY ERRON-
EOUS AND THEREFORE 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
In order to reverse the District Court's factual findings, 
this Court must find that it was plainly unreasonable for the 
trial judge not to be firmly convinced of plaintiff's claims. 
Inasmuch as plaintiff does not dispute the propriety of 
Judge Winder's interpretation of the law, he is asking this 
Court to reverse purely factual findings, without the benefit 
of live testimony, observation of the witnesses' demeanor or 
the other natural advantages of a trial judge. This Court 
defined the standards for review of a case of this type in 
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, supra at 158: 
... [A] deed regular in form is presumed to convey the 
entire fee title, or at least whatever title the granter 
has .... [I]n order to overcome that presumption, one 
who attacks a deed has the burden of proving otherwise 
by clear and convincing evidence. 
Even though •.. the attempt to reform a deed is a 
proceeding in equity in which the [appellate] court may 
review the facts, it is nevertheless well establishecr--
that because of the advantaged position of the trial 
court, we give considerable deference to his findings and 
judgment .... [emphasis is original]. 
Of course, the rule enunciated in Jacobsen has been 
applied in many other contexts. E.g., Ream v. Fitzen, 581 
P.2d 145, 147 (Utah 1978) ("[T]he trial judge is in a far better 
position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to observe 
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their demeanor and to weigh the respective merits of the case."); 
Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., supra at 626; 
Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d 605, 369 P.2d 117, 121 (1962) 
("Although the question ... is a matter of equity, we will reverse 
the trial court's findings of fact only if we conclude that they 
are clearly erroneous."); Raulie v. United States, 400 F.2d 
487, 509-510 (10th Cir. 1968). 
Deference to a trial judge's factual determinations is par-
ticularly appropriate in cases involving a burden of clear 
and convincing proof: 
What constitutes clear, cogent and convincing proof 
necessarily depends upon the character and extent of the 
evidence considered, viewed in connection with the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances. Whether the evidence 
in a given case meets the standard of persuasion, desig-
nated as clear, cogent, and convincing, necessarily requires 
a process of weighing, comparing, testing, and evaluating-~ 
a function best performed by the trier of the fact, who 
usually has the advantage of actually hearing and seeing 
the parties and the witnesses, and whose right and duty 
it is to observe their attitude and demeanor. 
Bland v. Mentor, 63 Wash. 2d 150, 385 P.2d 727, 730 (1963). 
Accord, Smith v. King, 100 Ida. 331, 597 P.2d 217, 220 (1979). 
In the instant case, Judge Winder had to evaluate the tes-
timony of two witnesses, one of whom was an elderly, unlettered 
man, the other of whom was under the duress of a $60,000 obli-
gation to plaintiff Baker. He was confronted by a welter of 
conflicting documentation. His findings were carefully reached 
and are at least as supportable by the evidence as are plaintiff's 
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contentions. It would have been virtually impossible for the 
trial court to have found that plaintiff has discharged the 
very heavy burden which the law imposes in cases such as this. 
III 
PLAINTIFF HAS 
FAILED TO CITE 
SUBSTANTIAL 
SUPPORT FOR ITS 
CLAIMS HEREIN 
Plaintiff offers seven criteria by which he submits his 
claim should be evaluated. Application of those criteria simply 
does not support plaintiff's claim that the "facts and exhibits 
established at trial ... meet that level of proof requiring this 
Court to reverse the judgment of the District Court." Appellant's 
Brief, p.5. 
a. Cont~nuing Obligation of Granter to Pay Debt (p.6). 
Plaintiff claims that there was such a continuing obligation. 
However, as has been pointed out at page 13, above, Wade never 
attempted to collect on the "promissory notes" or to foreclose 
on the house. The parties' conduct simply does not indicate a 
continuing obligation by Taggart to pay an obligation to Wade. 
If one thing is clear in this case, it is that Wade and Taggart 
did not behave as creditor and debtor after March 19, 1975; 
they behaved as landlord and tenant. Applying the test of at 
least one jurisdiction, Wade's and Taggart's conduct alone would 
be dispositive of the case in defendant's favor: 
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While all the factors are to be considered, the 
controlling test is whether the grantor sustains the re-
lation of debtor to grantee after the execution of the 
instrument. [citations omitted] A mortgage is an inci-
dent of a debt, and without a debt there can be no mort-
gage. [citations omitted]. 
Credit Bureau of Preston v. Sleight, 92 Ida. 210, 440 P.2d 143, 
149 (1968). 
B. Relative Values (p.6). It is undisputed that Taggart's 
equity in the house in March, 1975 was $15-$25,000. Wade agreed 
to pay Taggart $20,000 for that equity. The price later was 
reduced by $3,000 in return for a second, one-year, option which 
undoubtedly was of some substantial value to Taggart. In sum, 
the purchase price was a plausible and proper one. 
c. Contemporaneous and Subsequent Acts of the Parties 
(pp. 6-8). Plaintiff claims that the "promissory notes", option 
agreement and tax returns of Taggart and Wade are probative of 
an equitable mortgage. The "promissory notes", and their lack 
of any sense (much less significance) , are discussed at pages 10-14 
above. They are probative of little, if anything. 
The option's incompatibility with a loan arrangement is 
discussed at pages 12-13 and 18, above. Quite simply, a mortgagor 
who was obliged to pay 18% annual interest would not sign an option 
requiring him to pay the equivalent of 36% annual interest to clear 
the same title; similarly, a lender who held a $20,000 obligation 
would not surrender his security for $10,900. The option fee 
obviously was an option fee, not disguised interest. The option 
does not support plaintiff's position. Indeed, the buy-back option 
itself cuts very strongly against a claim of mortgage. The essence 
of a mortgage arrangement is that the lender is guaranteed repaymen 
through foreclosure, if possible, and through a deficiency judgment 
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if necessary. tlY con~ra~~, an option, if unexercised, leaves the 
grantee with the property and no means of recovering his purchase 
price from the granter. 
[I]f [granter] does not exercise the option, it need never 
repurchase the property at all. Thus, ultimately [grantee] 
might never receive ... repayrnent of the amount advanced by 
it, which indicates a mortgage transaction was not contem-
plated. 
In re San Francisco Indus. Park, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 271, 275 
(N. D. Cal. 19 6 9) . 
Taggart's rental arrangements are discussed at page 15, 
above, and the matter of the taxes is discussed at pages 15-16, 
above. Neither of these matters are persuasive of plaintiff's 
claim. 
D. The Parties' Declarations and Admissions (pp. 8-10). 
Plaintiff offers two pages of excerpts (from 108-page trial 
transcript) to demonstrate that the evidence "clearly and convinc-
ingly" established that the transfer was really a loan. The 
trial court's decision was based upon Judge Winder's evaluation 
of all the testimony (not just excerpts), aided by the opportunity 
to observe the witnesses and their demeanor. 
Even the excerpts plaintiff relies upon reveal a confused 
situation. Plaintiff cites Taggart's deposition testimony, 
which is of questionable value, as has been noted at pages 7-8, 
above. Plaintiff also cites a couple of occasions, once in a 
deposition and once at trial when Taggart spoke in terms of a 
loan. However, these are more a testament to a capable lawyer's 
ability to exact information than evidence of what Taggart meant. 
Indeed, the excerpts cited are far from conclusive. At page 8 
of his Brief, plaintiff reproduces the following exchange: 
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Q You felt it was basically a loan and he was secured 
by the deed. Is that correct? 
A No, we treated it ... as a loan. But he had the option 
and I hoped to be able to pay it back .... 
Q But your testimony there does say it was treated as 
a loan? 
A Well, I maybe I said that, but in my mind, I may 
have treated it as that, but in actuality he owned the 
property. 
That testimony -- even taken alone -- certainly does not con-
elusively establish a loan. Indeed, Taggart denied that he 
"felt it was basically a loan" and stated that Wade "owned" the 
house. The most that can be said of Taggart' s purported "admission 
is that he took some comfort in thinking that the sale of his home 
with an option to re-purchase was somewhat like a loan; it 
obviously was his way of telling himself that he hadn't lost 
everything. As he said, a few lines below the cited excerpt, 
"When I sold the house ... I felt I was borrowing the first $10,000 
with the option to buy it back." R. 102. (emphasis added). 
Taggart's reference to having "borrowed" the money in 
the next excerpt on page 8 of the Brief is entirely inconsistent 
with the following sentence of that answer, which plaintiff does 
not quote: "I had no idea that things were collapsing around 
me and I thought I could turn this around very quickly and buy 
the house back." R. 107 (emphasis added). 
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Finally, plaintiff quotes Taggart, at page 9 of his Brief, as 
saying that, in the event of exercise of the second option, he 
"had to pay Mr. Wade the amount lent to me" plus the option fee 
and interest. However, in the very next question again not 
quoted in the Brief -- plaintiff's counsel asked: 
Q So you had to pay $20,000 plus $900 plus the interest. 
A Yes, I would assume so. As I recall, that was it. 
R. 112. It is well established that Wade paid Taggart $17,000, not 
$20,000. Thus, the $20,000 option price could not represent the 
amount of a loan. Therefore, the prior answer is contradicted. 
It represents only the confusion of a badly beaten man under tough 
cross-examination; it is not a meaningful statement of fact. 
The balance of Taggart's testimony is very different than 
plaintiff's selected excerpts. For example: 
[W]ade wouldn't grant me a loan. But he would buy the 
house and .. we ... worked out the terms of the sale of that 
house. . . . 
R. 98. 
. .. Each time he gave me money, he made me sign a 
note. Actually, the reverse should be true. I said, 
"Mr. Wade, you owe me the money." 
R. 99. 
Q [by Mr. Poole] But your testimony [in the deposition] 
does say it was treated as a loan? 
A Well, I maybe I said that, but in my mind, I may 
have treated it like that, but in actuality, he owned the 
property. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Well, when I sold the hous: ,::0 :_,::._::: - · ;.;. for 
$20,000, not $10,000. I felt that I was borrowing the first 
$10,000 with the option to buy it back." 
R. 102. 
R. 
The purchase price was $20,000. He was obligated to 
give it to me. 
109 (emphasis added) . 
Q You believe you don't owe him any money. 
A I don't. owe him any money. 
Q Would you tell us the basis of that belief? 
A Well, he bought that house and I don't owe him any 
money. 
R. 123. 
Q Has there been any time since the end of 1976 that 
you have had the that you believed you could have raised 
$20,000 or more? 
A Sure. 
Q There have been? Did you ever offer to pay that -- to 
pay any sum to Mr. Wade for the house? 
A Yes, but he wouldn't sell it to me . 
... I asked him, Would you sell that house back to me?" and 
he said, "No. " 
R. 125. 
The most that can be said of Mr. Taggart's testimony is 
that, during the option's pendency, when he still hoped to be 
able to buy the house back, he liked to think of the transaction 
6/ as being something of a loan.~ However, he knew at all times 
6/The secret intention of one of the parties is insufficient to 
transmute the character of the transaction. To do so requires 
the intention of both parties that a deed absolute was meant 
to be a mortgage.~~ 
In re San Francisco Indus. Park, Inc., supra at 274 (N.D. Cal. 1969 
(emphasis in original). Of course, Taggart 1 s occasional wishful 
thinking hardly amounts to a "secret intention" anyway. 
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that he had sold the house, that it was Mr. Wade's and unless 
he could buy it back -- not repay a loan, but buy it back --
it always would be Wade's. 
Mr. Wade's testimony was emphatically to the effect that 
he, not Taggart, owned the house from March 19, 1975 forward. 
For example: 
Well, we talked at length about his house [before 
March 19, 1975] and he didn't want to sell the house and 
I didn't want to lend any money on it . 
... I told him I would buy it and he said he wouldn't 
sell it unless I gave him an option to repurchase it. 
R. 151. 
So, when I gave him the thirty-one fifty [i.e., the 
November 28 check for $3150] , I signed on the back in 
payment in full without any question of a doubt that that 
was my house. 
R. 17 9. 
Plaintiff attempts to rebut all of the above testimony with 
a single excerpt from pages 178-179, in which Mr. Wade repeatedly 
spoke of Mr. Taggart's option to "buy back" or "repurchase" the 
property -- which, of course, connotes a purchase, not a loan. 
Plaintiff hangs his entire claim as to Mr. Wade on the final 
answer, which is typical of Mr. Wade's occasional lapses into 
incoherence : 
And he knew and I knew that if he didn't exercise that 
option, he was to get $20,000. And if he paid it back, 
he was to pay the $20,000 with stipulations on it. 
R. 179. 
That answer is so internally contradictory as to suggest 
no more than an old man's ~atigue and confusion (which the 
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trial judge could observe and evaluate) . What Mr. Wade appears to 
be saying, albeit poorly, is that if the March 19 option was not 
exercised, the $20,000 was Taggart's which certainly does not 
sound like a loan. The answer's second sentence refers to the seci 
option which was not the subject of the question. Plaintiff's bur( 
was to prove clearly and compellingly that both Wade and Taggart 
intended a loan. The converse has occurred; neither person's 
testimony proves such an event. 
E. Written evidence (pp. 10-11). Plaintiff, at page 10 
of his Brief, urges that a statement on one of the three notes 
(Exh. P-3) that it was secured by the Taggart home is dispositive 
of his claim. However, that statement -- which does not appear 
on another of the notes, Exhibit P-9 -- is inconsistent with Tagga1 
endorsement of the last check, Exhibit P-10, as final payment 
for the house. The notes' lack of probative value already has 
been discussed at length. 
Plaintiff, at page 11 of his Brief, characterizes the option 
fee included in the March 19 option agreement as "interest", 
as he must in order to claim that this was a loan. However, 
as has been pointed out, at page 12 above, the option fee, if 
it were interest, would have been double the interest on the $10,00 
which Taggart had agreed to pay. The fee does not appear to 
be an interest payment. 
F. Nature and Character of Testimony Relied Upon (p. 11). 
Notwithstanding his claim, just two pages earlier, that Messrs. 
Taggart's and Wade's testimonies supported his position, plaintiff 
acknowledges that Taggart's and Wade's "oral testimony says 
that a sale occurred". However, plaintiff claims that this 
was the testimony of the "biased" witnesses. Certainly, Mr. Wade 
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had an interest in the outcome of the case and thus had a "bias"; 
what litigant does not? However, the trial court, after ob-
serving Mr. Wade for a day, decided that his testimony deserved 
enough weight to defeat plaintiff's claim. 
Mr. Taggart, on the other hand, had more compelling reasons 
to testify in plaintiff's favor than in Mr. Wade's. Plaintiff 
has a judgment of $45,813.51, plus interest, against Mr. Taggart. 
R. 2. That judgment plus accumulated interest amounts to 
approximately $60,000 today. Plaintiff's Brief, p.2. According 
to plaintiff's computations, the present equity in the former 
Taggart home, over and above its mortgages and what plaintiff 
claims is Wade's "equitable mortgage", is "in excess of $50,000" 
or enough to nearly satisfy Baker's judgment. Id., p. 12. Taggart's 
estimate of the property's value was even higher. R. 127. 
Although there may be little love lost between Taggart 
and Baker, Baker's success in this litigation would liquidate 
nearly all of Taggart's liability to him. With a little luck, 
the property's sale could liquidate the entire liability. (Of 
course, Taggart would have to find a new home, but at a $450 
monthly rental that should not be difficult.) On the other hand, 
if Baker is unsuccessful, he will find other means of pur-
suing Taggart. Taggart stands to lose both money and peace if 
Wade prevails and stands to lose only a little convenience if 
Baker does. 
Plaintiff has failed to show that Taggart is biased against 
his cause. 
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Plaintiff's claim that it is entitled to reversal of the 
district court's judgment is without support in the cases he has 
cited. In Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948), 
this Court affirmed a trial court's finding of a mortgage. In 
that case, the underlying agreement stated that its purpose was 
to procure a loan and recognized that granter retained the right 
to sell the property. Id., 189 P.2d at 120-122. Neither of 
those events occurred in this case. Further, and significantly, 
the Court in Bybee affirmed the trial court's factual findings, 
showing the deference to the trial judge's superior vantage point 
which defendant urges herein. 
In Gibbons v. Gibbons, supra, this Court affirmed a judgment u 
holding the character of a transfer of property as a sale. In 
that case, granter transferred certain real property, reserving 
a life estate in herself. Grantee was required by the agreement 
to sell the property upon grantor's death and retain only his 
purchase price plus interest (Id., 135 P.2d at 106-107), an 
arrangement bearing far more resemblance to a loan than the in-
stant transaction. Nevertheless, the trial Court found, and the 
Supreme Court affirmed, that the fact that the granter apparently 
had no right to sell the property suggested that the transfer was 
not a mortgage. The Court concluded: 
The controlling question is what was the intention of 
the parties at the time of the execution and delivery of 
the instrument? The matters indicated above are merely 
the elements of the instruments executed ..•. 
Supra at 107. In Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d 940 
(1933), a purported sale was found to be a transfer in 
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trust or a mortgage (the Court did not decide which) on the 
basis of grantor's testimony to that effect (Id., 25 P.2d at 
943-944), a great discrepancy between the property's value and 
the consideration given by grantee (Id., supra at 948-949) and 
the fact that the granter and grantee "recognized this trust or 
mortgage relationship ... from [their] conduct immediately and for 
a long time thereafter" (supra at 950), even to the point that 
the grantee "rendered detailed statements monthly to [granter] ... 
showing ... the balance due." (Supra at 94 7.) That case is not 
analogous to the matter at bar. 
Finally, in Orlando v. Berns, 154 Cal. App. 2d 753, 316 
P.2d 705 (1957), the only remaining case cited by plaintiff, the 
District Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's finding of 
a mortgage, based in large measure on the testimony to one of 
the parties to the transaction that the parties intended the 
grantee to "receive a mortgage on the property" and that he in 
turn would use the property as collateral for a loan from an 
insurance company. Id., 316 P. 2d at 707. The trial court based 
its finding upon the grantor's testimony, the fact that the 
purported purchase price of $178,000 was $114,000 less than the 
value of the property transferred and that grantee admittedly 
computed the resale price on the basis of "purchase price" plus 
interest. Ibid. (However, such a method of computation would 
not support a finding of a mortgage in Utah, in view of Gibbons 
v. Gibbons, supra, 135 P.2d at 106-107). In the instant case, 
by contrast, the transaction was not entered into for the purpose 
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of obtaining funds from a lending institution; both parties to 
the transaction have stoutly contended that the transaction was 
a sale; the purchase price was a fair approximation of the 
property's value; and repurchase prices under both options 
$10,000 and $24,500 -- were not computed on the basis of purchase 
price plus interest. Finally, and perhaps most important, 
Orlando was an affirmance of a trial court's finding, not an 
appellate court's substituting its judgment of the facts, wit-
nesses, etc., for that of the trial judge. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff seeks to set aside a transfer of real property 
which was absolute on its face. The record herein reflects a 
transaction by which the Wades acquired Charles Taggart's former 
home in March, 1975 for the fair value of his equity and, in the 
intervening five years, never made any effort to recover their 
purchase price from him. Taggart twice was given options to 
re-purchase the home at prices wholly inconsistent with what Baker 
alleges to have been the loan arrangement, but once those options 
lapsed, Mr. Wade refused to let him buy the property back. From 
the date of purchase to date, Mr. Wade has behaved like the owner 
of the property and Mr. Taggart has behaved like a tenant. In sum, 
Taggart had no continuing obligation to pay Wade and had no con-
tinuing right to redeem the property; he was not a mortgagee. 
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Wade's and Taggart's conduct consistently reflected a pur-
chase. The documentation also reflected a purchase, with the 
exception of the "promissory notes" which are inconsistent with 
either party's theory, with the other documents and with the 
parties' conduct. Finally, the transaction's participants have 
testified that they intended a sale, not a mortgage. Plaintiff, 
who was required to prove his case by clear and convincing 
evidence, has not overcome the strong indications of a sale which 
appear throughout the record. 
In addition to failing to rebut the above evidence, plaintiff 
has failed even to present a coherent theory of his case. He 
bases a claim of a mortgage principally on the supposed promissory 
notes, which his counsel admitted, "I can't frankly can't explain ... 
It doesn't make sense to me, either." R. 107. Nevertheless, 
plaintiff askectthe District Court to find an equitable mortgage 
in the principal sum of $20,000 (Ibid.) based upon promissory 
notes for $27,000 and a transaction in which $17,000 changed hands! 
Plaintiff's failure to deal with the evidence and describe the 
transaction satisfactorily is compounded by his failure to suggest 
a,ny reason tor the parties' conduct. Why would Wade make a loan 
to anyone who was as bad a risk as Taggart? Would it not have 
made far more sense to buy in March than foreclose in December? 
What would Taggart have gained by incurring still another debt; 
did it not make far more sense for him to sell with an option and 
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thus be able to walk away if he did not have funds when the 
option expired? If Taggart was a debtor under an unforeclosed 
mortgage, how could Wade have refused to let him pay off the 
encumberance in 1978, when he finally was able to do so? 
The District Court, after careful consideration of the 
transaction, documentation, events and the testimony and demeanoI 
of the witnesses -- which was essential to an understanding of 
the unorthodox Wade or the easily distraught Taggart -- was 
unconvinced of plaintiff's claim. In view of the heavy burden 
plaintiff bore and the many gaps in his case, it could not have 
been otherwise. It cannot be said that the result was unreasonab 
The judgment below should be 
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